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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the owners of an aircraft to recover 
from the insurer and/or the insurance agent their losses sustained 
in the destruction of the aircraft and an action between the 
insurer and the insurance agent to apportion such liability 
between them. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted the plaintiffs, Stephen F. Kesler, 
W. T. Bissell, Ronald McClain, Elmo Walker, Donald L. Oborn, and 
the plaintiff-intervenor, Gary Ferguson, collectively (hereafter 
referred to as "Plaintiffs"), a judgment against Donald A. Dyson 
and L. F. Dyson & Associates, jointly and severally (hereafter 
referred to as "the Dysons"), in the amount of $20,294.76. 
Ranger Insurance Company and Aviation Office of America (hereafter 
referred to as "Ranger/AOA") were awarded a judgment of "no cause 
of action" on all claims against them. from this action of the 
trial court, the Dysons have appealed, l/and the plaintiff's have 
eros s- appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs are seeking the following relief from this 
Court: 
ll Kenneth R. Shannon, pilot of the aircraft at the time it was destroyed 
was a defendant below and based upon his default, a judgment was entered 
against him and in favor of the plaintiffs, plus Donald A. Dyson, in the 
amount of $25,368.45. That judgment is not at issue in this appeal. 
-1-
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A. For an Order of this Court reversing the trial court 
and awarding plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor attorneys fees 
in this matter, including this appeal; 
B. For an Order of this Court reversing the trial court 
and awarding them 10. 58/o interest on the judgment from date of los: 
C. Pursuant to Rule 73(1), awarding them the amount of 
their judgment against the Dysons plus 25% thereof as damages 
for the Dysons frivolous and delaying appeal of plaintiffs' judgm::~ 
D. For an Order of this Court dismissing the Dysons' 
appeal of plaintiffs' judgment; and, 
E. For an Order of this Court entering a Declaratory Juc~· 
ment against the Dysons, declaring them liable to Gary Ferguson 
for his liability, if any, to Donald Oborn resulting from the 
loss of the aircraft. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 18, 1975, Donald A. Dyson, Donald L. Oborn, 
Stephen F. Kesler, W.T. Bissell and Ronald McClain purchased a 
1968 Cessna Aircraft. The aircraft was financed by Walker Bank 
& Trust Company upon a promissory note entered into jointly and 
severally by the above owners (exhibit 36). Simultaneously, the 
owners requested Donald A. Dyson to procure insurance on the air· 
craft, inasmuch as he is a licensed insurance agent and an em-
ployee and owner of L.F. Dyson & Associates, Inc., an insurance 
agency licensed to sell aircraft insurance in the State of Utah. 
I 
Dyson agreed to procure and maintain insurance in force and effec: ; 
on the aircraft in the amount of $27,000.00, the purchase price 
of the aircraft (R. 365,383,767,768). Dyson received a com-
mission on the sale of the insurance for the aircraft (R. 557). 
-2-
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Thereafter, McClain sold his interest in the aircraft to Oborn 
;nd: Walker. For both of these sales, Dyson caused the insurance 
policies to be endorsed to provide coverage for them as pilots of 
the aircraft. In December, 1975, Dyson sold his interest in the 
aircraft to Shannon. Dyson also submitted a request to Ranger 
Insurance Company that Shannon be added as a pilot of the aircraft 
ooder the insurance policy. Before receiving confirmation that 
Shannon had been added as a pilot under the insurance policy, Dyson 
delivered the keys to the aircraft to Shannon. 
On February 1, 1976, with Shannon at the controls, the 
aircraft crashed, causing injuries to the occupants and totally 
destroying the aircraft. The plaintiffs filed a claim against 
Ranger Insurance Company for the loss of the aircraft. Ranger 
denied the claim since an endorsement had never been issued cov-
ering Shannon. Thereafter, Dyson and the other owners met and, 
~ued upon Dyson's representation that Shannon was a covered pilot 
IK. 785) filed suit against Ranger. When it became apparent that 
Dyson had never received a written endorsement adding Shannon as 
apilot, the other owners filed suit in a Third Party Claim 
against Dyson and his insurance agency on the basis of breach of 
contract to procure insurance and negligence in failing to obtain 
coverage for Shannon while piloting the aircraft. 
Gary Ferguson was not initially a party in the action. 
However, when it became apparent that Donald Oborn, Ferguson's 
Hsignor, intended to claim against Ferguson based upon their 
contract, and that Ferguson might be collaterally estopped to 
-3-
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assert defenses in that action if he did not participate in this 
one, he was allowed to intervene as a party plaintiff. The court 
ruled, however, that the question of his relationship to Oborn was 
not a matter of dispute in this suit and ruled that he was forced 
to participate on the same basis as the other plaintiffs.?/ 
POINT I 
THE DYSONS' APPEAL OF PLAINTIFFS' JUDGMENT IS 
TOTALLY WITHOUT tfERIT, IS FRIVOLOUS AND SOLELY 
FOR DELAY AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED. PLAINTIFFS 
ARE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE AS DAl'1AGES AN ~10UNT 
EQUAL TO 25/~ OF THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM. 
The Dysons have failed to contest plaintiff's judgment rend· 
ered against them. Their Statement of Points on Appeal and their 
brief contain absolutely no exception to the trial court's findings 
supporting the determination of their liability to plaintiffs on 
both breach of contract and negligence. Their appeal should be 
dismissed. Accordingly, Respondents find it unnecessary to address 
the issues raised by the Dysons in their brief. Since they have 
acquiesced in plaintiff's judgment, this court's determination of 
the issue raised regarding the Dysons right to jury trial can not 
affect that judgment. 
Rule 73(1) provides: 
"(1) Dismissal of Appeal; Penalty for Delay. Failure of the 
appellant to take any of the further steps to secure the review of the 
case, except filing notice of appeal and depositing the fees therefo", 
shall not affect the validity of the appeal but is ground for such 
actions as the district court deems appropriate, which may include 
dismissal of the appeal. On the trial of the cause on appeal, i;' ;: 
appears to the court that the appeal was made sol<?liA fer• ki.l;t, it may 
add to the costs such damages as may be just, not exceeding twenty-fi" 
per cent of the judgment appealed from." (Emphasis added) 
This rule is similar to Rule 38, Federal Rules of Appellate 
Jj See discussion page 10, infra. 
-4-
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~ocedure. Under that rule, it has been held that where the appeal 
is made solely for the purose of delay, the court may award attor-
ney fees in addition to damages. ];Jq m:;eP •;. Fide!iry ~ Deposit Co • 
. JaJ•:;:c.r:.i, 554 2d. 539 (2nd Cir. 1977). See, Oscar Gruss & Son 
::;.mo:?Y'71~·':; i'u-cua: ·~"~s:;c.Z:jj ·:ompc.n!J, 422 F.2d 1278 (2nd Cir. 1970). 
~ule 38 is discussed generally in <'1o_!r8 's ?ederaZ Practice, Volume 
9, 1238.01 and . 02, pp. 4251 """ sea. In applying rules similar to 
~ule 73(1) in other jurisdictions, the courts have consistently 
;pplied the penalties where there was no probable cause to appeal 
the judgment [See, e.g., 5:er:ing v. Dairy De!ire, Inc. 494 P.2d 292, 
262 Or. 359 (1952); :u-:,:'rt v. !')rryi!'e Savings :1r:d :, . J.ln Asso~iatic'", 410 
? 2d 753, 147 Mont. 124 (1966)] and where the findings were amply 
rupported by the evidence and the appeal was merely taken on 
seneral grounds [See, 2.J., :-!a::;ro~.J v. F!i"T2r, 246 P.2d 54, 112 Ca.2d 
;~j (1952) l. 
In this case, the trial court found (l) that the Dysons 
1ad breached their contract to provide insurance coverage while 
t~e aircraft was being piloted by Shannon; (2) that Donald A. 
~son, individually and as agent for L. F. Dyson and Associates, 
:nc., was negligent in allowing Shannon to operate the aircraft 
?rior to obtaining insurance coverage for him; (3) that his neg-
ligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages, and; 
14) awarded judgment against him and his agency (R. 349. 353. 
l7l, 742). Although the Dysons stated in their Notice of Appeal 
:~at they were appealing this judgment, they have totally aban-
~n~ that claim, contesting neither the judgment nor the findings 
'?on which the judgment was based. The intent of their appeal is 
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to secure indemnification from Ranger/AOA. They say in their 
statement of "Relief Sought on Appeal": 
"Plaintiff Donald A. Dyson, as one of the Owners, seeks reversal of 
the trial court's judgment in favor of AOA and Ranger on plaintiffs' 
Complaint; and Donald A. Dyson and L.F. Dyson & Associates, as third-
party defendants and counter-claimants, seek reversal of the trial 
court's judgment against them in favor of AOA and Ranger on Dysons' 
Counterclaim and pray that the trial court be directed to enter judg-
ment in favor of Dysons against AOA and Ranger in che swry · -· ;nc. 
judgmenr; entered in favor of the ula.inti/,-~s c1ga~nst ":hem." (emphasis 
added) [App. Br. p.2] 
The failure to contest the plaintiffs' judgment against 
them, makes it apparent that they are hoping for a judgment of 
this court which will shift liability for the plaintiffs' losses 
from them to Ranger I AOA. Of course, they do not want to pay any 
money now if that contingency were to happen. Obviously, they 
have appealed plaintiff's judgment solely to delay making 
on the judgment. Absent an appeal, the Dysons would have ::~:::,: 
upon which to stay execution of plaintiff's judgment against th9 
ef. Rule 62(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Replacement Vo. 9B 
(1953 Rev.ed.). This maneuver by the Dysons clearly falls into 
the proscription of Rule 73(1); it is precisely the offensive 
abuse of the appellate process which Rule 73 (l), Federal Rule 38. 
and similar rules in other jurisdictions are designed to prev~t 
This court in this case is clearly warranted in assessing damages 
against the Dysons. 
That the plaintiffs' have suffered damages because of this 
frivolous appeal is obvious; they have had to obtain counsel 
to prosecute this appeal and they have had to pay 10. 58~~ interest 
on the note to Walker Bank & Trust Company with the expectancy 
of receiving a maximum of 3% interest when the judgment is final! 
-n-
have 'uffered in .:::.1. executed upon. The damages the plaintiffs 
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case, however, go far beyond this appeal. For the duration of 
this case, they have been locked into waiting while Ranger/AOA 
and the Dysons litigated who would be responsible for plaintiffs' 
admitted loss. At trial, the Dysons stipulated that if insurance 
coverage were found not to exist, they would be liable to the 
plaintiffs (R. 346-47, 349, 353, 371, 742). After this stipulation 
was entered, however, plaintiffs' counsel were required to spend 
five more days in court (R. 374). All during the time of discov-
ery and through the trial, the plaintiffs were required to pay 
10.58% interest on the note with Walker Bank. The delay and 
added costs of this appeal should not be borne by plaintiffs; 
the full 257o penalty should be assessed against the Dysons. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING 
PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEY FEES. 
While expenses of litigation and attorney fees are 
normally not recoverable unless expressly provided by contract 
~statute, in both contractual and tortious cases such expenses 
and attorney fees have been awarded where the actions by the 
liable party has caused the claimant to be involved in litigation 
'.lith third parties. See, 22 AM. Jur. 2d. §166; 45 A. L. R. 2d 1183; 
~A.L.R.3d 270. This court considered the question in In Re 
c'oast Tic;Ze C.·m:J:>l~l v. Har•tford, 325 P. 2d 906 (1958). 
-7-
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In that case, Hartford had provided a bond upon which Pacific was 
the obligee. When the contractor failed to perform and Pacific 
was required to incur attorneys fees in settlement of claims of 
materialmen, this court allowed Pacific to recover its attorney 
fees from Hartford on its bond. The court stated, at 379: 
The rule as to what damages are recoverable for breach of contract 
is based upon the concept of reasonable forseeability. That loss 
of such general character would result from the breach. Therefore, 
to be compensable, the loss must result from the breach in a nat-
ural and usual course of events so that it can fairly and reason-
ably be said that if the minds of the parties had averted to breach 
when the contract was made, loss of such character would be within 
their contemplation." 
"Applying the above rule to this case: It would reasonably be 
foreseen that the natural and usual consequence of Cassidy's 
failure to pay the labors and materialmen would bring about 
the series of events which occurred: that liens would be filed 
and legal proceedings instituted to enforce them; That Plaintiff 
Title Company, having the duty to keep the titles clear, would 
interpose defenses and attend to some disposition of the claims, 
which would require the services of attorney's and court costs 
incidental thereto. This is the type of loss for which Hart-
ford's Bond was given to guard against." 
The trial court reviewed the above authority but, in 
applying that authority to the facts of this case, ruled that t~ 
plaintiff's attorneys fees were incurred in asserting their claic:' 
against Dyson and not in litigation with third parties. Plaintif: I 
submit that the trial court misapplied the law in this case in the 
1 
following particulars: 
A. It is not disputed that when the aircraft was damaged 
and Ranger/AOA refused coverage, Dyson insisted to his co-owners 
that there was coverage for the aircraft and convinced them to 
secure counsel and file suit against Ranger/AOA (R. 748-49, 775-6, 
785). Even the trial court acknowledged in its memorandum decisic: 
that the plaintiffs did not sever their relationship with Dyson 
-X 
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until after Ranger I AOA had answered their complaint. By this time 
che plaintiffs were in litigation which, under the terms of the 
8olicy as >wgLgen~::ci Ol"ocurred by Dyson, they could not maintain direc-
ely against Ranger/AOA. 
B. As recognized at the outset of the trial, it was appar-
ent that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover from either 
Ranger/AOA or the Dysons. The plaintiffs were, however, forced 
' co participate in the lawsuit because of their being moving 
' parties in initiating the action and because they could not be 
~leased from attendance at the trial. (R. 374). The record 
clearly indicates that at the outset of the trial, the parties 
~ade several attempts to reach stipulations which would have 
allowed a judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiffs 
regarriless of how the liability was apportioned between Ranger/AOA 
and the Dysons. (R. 350-351; 353; 369; 372; 518; 616-623) 
However, failure to agree to the entry of such a stipulated 
judgment necessitated plaintiffs' counsel's continued attendance 
at the proceedings . 
C. From the record (R. 793-796), it is clear that the 
1 ~lk of plaintiffs' attorneys fees were incurred in the lengthy 
trial of the matter which lasted more than five days and prepar-
ation directly related to that trial. There can be no question 
~at the plaintiffs' attorneys fees were incurred as a direct and 
?roximate result of Dyson's negligence and breach of contract. 
Furthermore, such an expense was clearly foreseeable from Dyson's 
action in naming himself as the only "named insured" and in failing 
to secure coverage for Shannon as a pilot. Because of Dyson's 
_Q_ 
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role in the selection of counsel and initiation of a lawsuit 
against Ranger/AOA ( which he knew or should have known as an 
expert in the insurance business, could not be maintained because 
of his negligence in only naming himself as "named insured") he 
should now be estopped from denying that the attorneys fees incur-
red by plaintiffs were incurred in maintaining their action agains: 
third parties. 
D. The plaintiff-intervenor, Gary Ferguson, stands in 
somewhat different shoes than the other plaintiffs. As a purchase: 
of an interest in the aircraft from Donald Oborn, one of the 
original owners, he was not directly involved in procurring the 
insurance, nor was he directly obligated on the note with Walker 
Bank. Ferguson's counsel repeatedly attempted to introduce 
evidence of the relationship between Oborn and Ferguson, but was 
not allowed to do so by the Trial Judge (R. 324-325; 360-361; 
365-368; 619).1/ Ferguson suffered certain damages from the loss 
of the aircraft, but his biggest potential loss was his potential 
li Part of the evidence which Ferguson attempted to introduce to the Court 
related to Oborn's claim against Ferguson under their agreement for all 
damages such as Oborn might sustain (e.g., interest on the Walker Bank 
note, attorneys fees, etc.), and Ferguson's assertion that by instituting 
the action against the Dysons, Oborn had made an election under their 
agreement (Exhibit 1-PF) to declare a forfeiture and to retain all sums paic 
as liquidated damages. Ferguson's position was, therefore, that he was 
relieved of any obligation to Oborn and Oborn was entitled to receive all 
proceeds of the insurance. In that case, Ferguson would have no need to 
participate in the litigation in the instant case. Ferguson's counsel 
participated in the pre-trial settlement conference for the sole purpose 
of allowing the parties to resolve all disputes in the event settlement 
were reached. After settlement negotiations had failed, the suggestion 
by Judge Baldwin (presiding atthe pre-tn.al settlement conference) that 
Ferguson might be collaterally estopped from asserting claims against 
Dyson that would be litigated in this action made Ferguson's participation 
in this trial a necessity. 
-10-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
liability to Oborn. If Oborn sued Ferguson, he would file a third-
party complaint against Dyson based upon breach of contract and 
negligence, precisely the issues being litigated in this case. It 
,,as this possibility that led to the collateral estoppel suggestion. 
Obviously, the only reason for Ferguson participating in this trial 
at all was to obtain a declaratory judgment against Dyson on the 
liability issue. Despite the evidence supporting such relief, 
the court refused to grant it. (R. 822-824) Further, the Dyson 1 s 
cooosel resisted any attempt by Ferguson to raise this issue (R.360, 
366). Clearly, Ferguson 1 s predecessor in interest was competently 
~presented by Mr. Hintze and Ferguson really had no reason to be 
1 in the lawsuit except for that declaratory relief. Yet, he was 
I 
I 
I 
involved because of Judge Baldwin 1 s suggestion of collateral 
estoppel and, even more basically, because of the Dysons breach 
of contract and negligence in failing to obtain insurance for the 
aircraft while being piloted by Shannon. Ferguson gainsed nothing 
mre from his participation in this trial than he would have gained 
had he not been in it at all. Clearly he falls within the class 
of individuals entitled to receive attorneys fees under the 
above authority. Furthermore, since the Dyson 1 s counsel opposed 
Ferguson litigating for declaratory relief, they should now be 
estopped from denying that Ferguson 1 s attorneys fees were incurred 
in litigation with third parties. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
THE ACTUAL INTEREST INCURRED BY 
PLAINTIFFS ON THE NOTE WITH WALKER 
BANK & TRUST COMPANY FROM THE DATE OF 
LOSS UNTIL THE DATE OF PAYMENT. 
.........__ 
-11-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In making an award of damages for breach of contract, the 
Court attempts to put the injured party in as good a position as 
he would have been had the contract been fully performed. · ,_, 
Pmti, 514 P.2d 823 (Alaska, 1973). The desired objective in 
computing damages is to evaluate any loss suffered by the most 
direct, practical and accurate method. Even Cd.ds, Inc:. u . . v> ·..;, >:, 
448 P.2d 709, 22 Utah2d 49 (1968). See also, ?J.u,:fic• --~~=· ~·. 
H,n•tj'ord, infra. The evidence before the court in this case was 
uncontroverted that the time of the crash of the aircraft, there 
was a principal balance due on the promissory note at Walker Bank 
in the amount of $25,350.79 (R. 790) and that the note bore inter-
est at the rate of 10. 58'7. per annum (R. 790, 776). Since Dyson 
was one of the obligor's on the promissory note, there can be no 
question but what it was foreseeable on his part that if the 
aircraft were destroyed and insurance coverage was not obtained, 
he and the other obligators would be required to make payment on 
the note and would have to pay the 10.58% interest rate. The tria~ 
judge ruled that interest at the 10.58% rate was not allowable sinco 
the plaintiffs would have had to pay that interest rate regardless 
of Dyson's actions. His position is untenable. If the contract 
had not been breached, the insurer would have paid for the loss anc 
the plaintiffs would not have been required to pay the higher in-
terest while Ranger/AOA and the Dysons were squabbling about who 
was liable to the plaintiffs. If the aircraft had not been 
destroyed, the plaintiffs would have paid the higher interest, but 
they would have had the use of their aircraft. Hhile it is clear: 
foreseeable that some incidental interest differential might accrJt' 
-12-
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in the 30 to 60 days required to make settlement on the insurance 
claim. but for the breach of contract and negligence of the 
~sons, the plaintiffs would not have paid the interest at the 
higher rate for the period of time that they have. The trial 
judge's failure to make the Dysons pay the higher interest rate 
is unfathomable when one considers that, as a joint obligator on 
~e note, Dyson was contractually responsible for paying 10.58% 
an~ay. In effect, Dyson has agreed to pay the higher rate of 
interest. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERB.ED B NOT GRA..~TING 
GARY FERGUSON A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
AGAI~ST THE DYSONS. 
As pointed-out above, the only reason for Ferguson being 
in the lawsuit was to obtain judgme:1t against the Dysons, de-
claring them to be liable to him for claims which Oborn might 
make based •J.pon the agreement ber..Teen Ferguson and Oborn. The 
evicence clear:.:' re:lects that Dyson was a·..Tare of Ferguson's in-
terest in :~e aircra:: and !lis p•.1rchase of that interest from 
Oborn (:Z. 400, /j7-j5). J:;son ::.ace representations to Ferguson 
and to the other owners that he had acquired insurance on the 
aircraft ·n-:1:.:e ':Jein; pC:..:.o:ed b:; Shannon (!\. 750-51). Clearly, 
his neglige:1ce ar:c! breac:-. c: contract, as found by the Court and 
not ccmtestei :::: appea:.., ·.;as :he direct, acti•;e and proximate 
cat:se o: ?er~·~sc:-.· s ::c::e:-.::.a~ :..iabi~i.:y to Oborn •.1nder their 
agree::e:-.: 
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to relief, judgment shall be entered although the relief to 
which the party is entitled was not specifically prayed for in 
the pleadings. Rule 54(c)(l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Replacement Vol. 9B (1953 Rev.Ed.). Cf., Rule 54(c), Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Moore's Federal Practice,Vol. 6, ,54.62, pp. 
126lff. See, also, Da:nn v. Studebaker-Packard Corporation, 288 F .2d 
201 (6th Cir. 1961); Ortiz v. EngZebrecht, 61 FRD 381 (D.C. N.J. 
1973). Even though the claimant may not be entitled to the 
specific relief requested, the Court may retain jurisdiction to 
grant declaratory relief as established by the evidence. Ortiz 
v. EngZebrecht, supra. 
All parties required in an action for declaratory relie: 
were present in this action. See, §78-33-11, Utah Code Annotated. 
Replacement Volume 9A (1953 Rev.ed.). In no way would the entryc: 
a declaratory judgment against the Dysons prejudice an interested 
party, including the Dysons, since all were present and had an 
opportunity to contest and litigate the evidence presented. The 
issue of Ferguson's damages, if any, could be ascertained in 
a supplemental proceeding. See, §78-33-8, Utah Code Annotated. 
CONCLUSION 
Having raised no objections to the findings regarding 
their breach of contract and negligence nor objections to the 
evidence underlying those findings, the Dysons have abandoned 
their appeal of the plaintiffs' judgment and same should be deniec 
However, inasmuchas the appeal of the plaintiffs' judgment was 
solely to delay making payment on it, the Dysons should be penal· 
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ized for this abuse of the appellate process and the plaintiffs 
compensated for their damages in such abuse by assessing the 
Dysons 25% of the judgment amount. Plaintiffs are entitled to 
a reversal of the trial courts determination on the interest 
rate and are entitled to be awarded 10.58% interest on the judg-
ment from the date of loss until paid. Plaintiffs should be 
awarded their attorneys fees incurred in this appeal and in 
the trial of this matter. Plaintiff-Intervenor Gary Ferguson 
should be awarded his attorneys fees incurred in this appeal 
and in the trial of this matter and should be awarded declaratory 
judgment against the Dysons adjudging them liable to him for 
damages he may sustain by reason his liability to Oborn. The 
determination of those damages should be reserved for subsequent 
proceeding.>. 
Resp~tively submitted this 
~day of October, 1978. 
-15-
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Attorneys for Gary Ferguson. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage prepaid, two 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents Stephen F. Kesler, 
W.T. Bissell, Ronald McClain, Donald Oborn, Elmo Walker and 
Gary Ferguson (Intervenor), to each counsel for the parties 
as designated below on the _____ day of October, 1978. 
DATED this 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellants Donald A. Dyson and 
L.F. Dyson & Associates, Inc. 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
of and for 
BAYLE & LAUCHNOR 
200 South Main Street, #1105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Arpellant Donald A. Dyson 
STUART L. POELMAN 
of and for 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
200 South Main Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondents Aviation Office o: 
America and Ranger Insurance Company. 
______ day of October, 1978. 
R. CLARK ARNOLD 
RAYMOND A. HINTZE 
Attorneys for Respondents 
-16-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
